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Summary findings
Ukraine encountered many economic  problems in its first  Based  on examination of the experience  of other
yrars of indepeidence. Most serious among external  countries in addressing  adverse  shocks, the authors
shocks  were the collapse  of trade with the former Soviet  recommend  the following  policies:
Union and sharp price increases  for energy imports.  * Full commitment  to systemic  reform and
External shocks resulted in an income loss in the current  macroeconomic  stabilizarion.
accounts  equivalent to about 14 percent of GDP a year in  *  Privatization,  price liberalization,  devclopment  of a
1992 and 1993.  competitive  market system, and reform of the legal
Ukraine  did not adopt an appropriate strategy for  system.
dealing with the impact of these shocks.  Its main policy  For the particular situation of Ukraine, they emphasize
response  has been to conrinue  borrowing, increase  the importancc of:
arrears, postponc adjustments,  and restore administrative  *  Growth-oriented structural adjustment that reflects
interventions.  Not only has this policy  exacerbated  the  Ukraine's comparative  advantages,  including  the
economic  crisis, ir has led to massive  capital flight  and  development of nontraditional industries  with high
rapid expansion of the underground economy.  value-added  and low energy intensity.
With the limited information  available,  McCarthy,  *  Greater economic (especially  energy)  efficiency.
Pant, Zheng, and Zanalda try to identify  the major  *  Integration into world systems  of trade and finance.
sources of external shocks  and to estimare  their impact  - Prudent borrowing and debt management  strategies,
on the ci  :rrent  account They also evaluate  Ukraine's  as well as policies  to encourage private forcign direct
policy  responses.  investment  and to make more efficient  use of foreign
debt.
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..External  Shocks and Performance  Responses during  Systemic Transition
- The Case of Ukraine
I.  Introduction
Ukraine has suffered substantially  from  to maintain the country's production and trade
adverse  external  shocks  ever  since  its  patterns.  These policies have not worked: real
independence from  the  former  Soviet Union  GDP has fallen by about 40 percent during the
(FSU) in 1991. What were the major sources of  last three years and capital flight intensified.
these shocks? How large was the impact  of the
external shocks on the balance of payments in  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is,  with
general and on the current account balance in  limited  information,  to:  (a)  identify  major
particular? How did the economy  react to these  sources of  external shocks;  (b) estimate the
shocks?  What was the policy response? While  impact  of  identified shocks  on  the  current
this  paper  does  not  attempt  to  provide  a  account  of  BOP;  (c)  examine  Ukraine's
definitive answer to  all of these questions, it  performance  responses to  these  shocks;  (d)
does offer some insights both qualitatively and  review  some  successful  and  unsuccessful
quantitatively.  international  experiences in coping with extenal
shocks;  and  finally  (e)  suggest some  policy
As  a  young  republic  deprived  of  recommendations to  lessen  the  impacts  of
independent policy  making  for  over  seven  external shocks over the short to medium terms.
decades, the Ukrainian government started its  The basic methodology 3 is adopted from Balassa
systemic  transformation  with  only  limited  and McCarthy (1984), which provides a simple
experience in formulating strategies to confront  but robust way of decomposing the observable
significant  domestic  problems  and  external  aggregate  impact  into  effects  caused  by
instability. The breakup of the FSU and CMEA  individual recognizable exteral  shocks.  The
disrupted the input-output  linkages forged in the  current accounts with the FSU and with the rest
central  planning  regime.  Collapse  of  the  of the world (ROW) are treated separately to
inter-republic  trade  and  payments  systems  figure out regional sources of different shocks.
further  hindered  exchanges  of  goods  and  Four broad classes of shocks are considered: (i)
services among republics to sustain output and  energy price shocks; (ii) non-energy terms-of-
income.  Moving to  international prices  for  trade shocks; (iii) export demand shocks; and
inter-republic  trade  subjected  Ukraine  to  a  (iv)  the  accumulated cost  of  extra-financing
remarkable terms-of-trade loss'.  Moreover,  caused  by shocks in previous periods. Five kinds
repeated  price hikes of imported energy not only  of  economic  performance  responses  are
created  sizable trade deficits for Ukraine  but also  considered:  (i)  improvements  in  services
contributed to an overall shrinking of economic  accounts; (ii) economic contraction; (iii) export
activities  in  the  country.  Macroeconomic  promotion/diversification;  (iv)  import
uncertainties and lack of progress in economic  substitution/compressior.;  and  (iv)  external
reforms limited Ukraine's access to  external  finanCing.4
financing.  The policy response to these shocks
has  been  characterized by  stop-and-go  and  The  main  conclusions of  this  paper
increased administrative interventions designed  include that adverse external shocks did affect
1the Ukrainian economy substantially, while the  some  basic characteristics of  Ukraine's  trade
performance response was not  very effective.  structure.  Section III examines major sources of
Rough  estimates show that external  shocks could  external  shocks.  In  Section  IV,  a  simple
account for up to about half of 40 percent loss  conceptual  and  computational  framework  is
of GDP over the past three years.  The rest of  given for the quantitative  analysis of the impacts
this  loss may be attributed to other efficiency  of the shocks and the responses of the economy.
losses  and lack of structural adjustments  in many  Broad estimates  of the impacts of and responses
sectors of the economy.  As energy prices reach  to external shocks for the past two years are also
the world levels, it becomes critical that policy  presented.  Section V illustrates cross-country
makers address these issues.  experiences in  dealing  with  external shocks.
Section VI concludes  this paper by summarizing
The  rest of  the paper is organized as  the  main findings  indicating some  areas that
follows.  Section  II  briefly  discusses recent  warrant policy consideration.
macroeconomic  development in Ukraine and
H.  Some  Aspects  of the  Ukrainian  Economy  in  Transition:  1991-93
In this  section,  recent macroeconomic  first  years  of economic transition  in Ukraine
development in  Ukraine  and  also  its  trade  very painful.  According to official statistics,
structure  are  briefly  reviewed.  This  helps  total output declined by about 14 percent in 1992
explain why the economy is highly vulnerable  to  and  18 percent in  1993.  Industrial output is
external shocks and how these shocks have such  estimated to have fallen by almost 40 percent in
a  pervasive  effect  on  domestic  economic  the first half of 1994.  Real GDP in  1993 was
activity.  less than 60 percent of its 1989 level 5 . Though
the  official  unemployment  rate  remains
negligibly small, probably as much as one-third
2.1  Recent Macroeconomic Devdopment  of the  labor force of 24  million is  either  on
A Brief Review  short-time working, indefinite unpaid leave or
underemployed.  Domestic  investment
During  the  Soviet  era,  Ukraine was  practically  haltedc  Following  partial
heavily industrialized and at the same time the  liberalization  of prices in 1992 and accompanied
"bread basket'  of the whole Union.  In 1990,  by lax fiscal and monetary policies, the annual
the  year  before  independence,  industry  and  average inflation rate increased from about 1400
agriculture contributed over 40 percent and 30  percent in 1992 to 5000 percent in  1993, with
percent  of  the  total  net  material  product,  monthly inflation  close to 50 percent through the
respectively.  The  economic  structure  was  second half of the year.  However, in the first
shaped to  serve the political  purposes of  the  quarter of 1994, the monthly inflation  rate came
central planners,  and was,  to  a large extent,  down sharply, remaining at single digital level
geared  to  meet  military  needs.  With  a  since March.  This was attributable in part to a
dominating  state ownership  of production  means,  significant tightening of monetary policy during
little concern was given to economic efficiency  late 1993 and early 1994, and a sharp decline in
in output production and resource allocation.  real wage.  The state budget deficit was largely
compressed, from 16.5 percent of GDP in 1992
Heavy heritages of the collapsed  socialist  te  less than 10 percent in  1993.  Subsidies to
system and weaklpolicies  toward macroeconomic  consumers and producers still took 40 percent of
stabilization arnd structural  adjustments made  the  total  fiscal  revenue.  However,  this
23
improvement  in  the  deficit  is  probably  not
sustainable, because it  was achieved without  Table  I
structural reforms and mainly by cutting public  Ukraine:  Recent  Macroeconomic  Development
investment  and squeezing enterprises for income  in..cic  Develop
taxes.  The  fiscal  deficit  has  been  largely  1991  1992  1993
financed  by  money  creation  which  fueled  --
inflation and  eroded public confidence.  The  Real  Growth  Rate  in%
value of the karbovanets plummeted from Krb  GDP  at Factor  Cost  -13.4  -14.0  -18.0
749  per  US  dollar at end-1992 to  over  Krb  Exports  -18.6  -16.0
50,000 per US dollar in the summer of 1994.  Imports  -25.6  -23.4
Private  Consumption  - 9.1  - 9.6
Enlarged bills on oil and gas  imports
from Russia was a principal factor in generating  As % of GDP
large  external  imbalances.  The  volume of  Domestic  nestint  13.6  12.0  3.0
imports declined  by a significantly  larger degree  Total  Consumption  83.2  90.1  92.6
than exports  in recent  years  but terms of  trade  Resoure Balance  - 1.7  - 2.1  - 0.6
deterioration  kept  Ukraine's  current  account
negative.  Lack of foreign exchange including  iscid  Accounts
Russian rubles forced Ukrine  to fill the external  Revenue and  Grants  26.0  29.0  34.4
gap  by  accumulating trade  arrears.  Living  Expenditure  36.8  45.5  38.4
standards for most of the population have fallen  Budget  deficit  -10.8  - 16.5  - 4.0
steeply, by about  30 percent in 1993 on average
as compared with that in 1991.  The real wage  Current Account Balance  - 1.7  - 2.1  -Os.
is  es-imated to have  fallen by  more than 50
percent between December 1992 and December  Inflation Rate  (CPI)  (%)  91.2  1445.3 4927.0
1993. Intensifying  energy shortages in 1993  led  ExchgeyRate (nibiUySE  1.7  221.2  7629.0
to widespread rationing and a harsh winter for  Energy Intensity Index  90.6  95.5  100.0
the  population.  Meanwhile,  the  Ukrainian  Sources:  Uk.ainian  authorities  and staff calculations
economy  becomes  more  energy  intensive,
because the contraction of energy consumption
has been notably smaller than the overall output
decline. Clearly, the external shocks rooted in
the  disintegration  of  the  FSU  and  the
inappropriate performance responses to  these  2.2  Trade Pattern
shocks played a significant role in the current
crisis.  Despite its  large  size,  the  Ukrainian
economy was very open, especially to the FSU
Selected statistics for the recent macro-  region.  The degree of openness, defined as the
economic development in Ukraine are given in  sum of the import-GDP ratio and the export-
Table I.  These portray an economy in serious  GDP ratic,  was 82.5 percent in 1991 (of which
distress.  At this juncture there have been few  68.7 percent to the FSU), then shrank to 20.3 in
major institutional  reforms. Some municipalities  1992 and 33.0  and 1993, because the size of
have initiated privatization of small enterprises  trade  decreased  substantially.  Regional
and retail outets,  but these are local initiatives  specialization  and extensive integration into the
and not a significant part of the overall picture.  Moscow  dominated  planning  system  made
Ukraine highly dependent on FSU markets not
only for its imported energy, raw materials and
consumer goods, but  also as a market for its4
intermediate  industrial  output and agricultural  percent of  Ukraine's 1992 exports to  and
products.  Inter-republic  trade traditionally  imports  from the FSU.  The share  of imports
accounted  for more  than  four-fifths  of Ukraine's  from  Turkmenistan  jumped  from  an insignificant
total trade.  In the last three years, lack of  0.1 percent in  1991 to 4.9 percent in  1992,
adjustments  to mitigate  the impact  of substantial  almost  completely  due to price rises of natural
terms  of trade  deterioration,  mainly  energy  price  gas.
hikes, led to further  deterioration  of the trade
deficit with the FSU--from  US$0.7  billion in  - III
1991 to  US$1.1 billion in  1992, and then  Table  III
(estimated)  to a level over US$3.0  billion in  Ukraine: Major Trade Partners in FSU
1993. The overall trade deficit is a little less  (As % of the Total Inter-republic  Trade)
because Ukraine ran a modest surplus with the  ...................................
rest of the world.  Export  Imports
1991  1992  1991  1992
Table  I  Russia  70.8  72.1  79.2  80.5 Belarus  7.8  9.5  6.8  6.6
Inter-Republic  Trade Matrix:  1993  Kazakhstan  4.3  4.9  4.8  3.2
TurkmeniStan  0.7  0.5  0.1  4.9
As%o Imports  from  Other  16.4  13.0  9.1  4.8
As S%  of  Imtports  from  -----------  -----------  ----------
Trade  Value  Russia  Vkrine  Other  Total  Sources: IMF,  1993 Country  Review:  Ukraine
Exports  to
Russia  10.7  22.7  33.4
UJkraine  2 0  3  6.5  26.8
Other  26.4  4  .3.  9I.3  39.8  The  relative importance  of trade partners
Total  46.7  14.8  38.5  100.0  also  changed  substantially  in  1992.  Inter-
republic trade accounted for four-fifrhs of all
Source:  Staff  calculations.  trade in 1991, but less than half in 1992, mainly
reflecting the  valuation effect of the sharp real
depreciation of  the  ruble against convertible
currencies.  Historically  socialist  countries
Historically,  Ukraine was an engine for  continue as  Ukraine's  most  important trade
socialist industrialization in the Soviet Union.  partners.  Three countries absorbed in  1992
Exports of food,  coal, metal, and machinery  nearly half of  Ukraine's  exports: China (23
from  Ukraine contributed remarkably to  the  percent), former Czechoslovakia (13 percent),
regional development. This important role of  and Bulgaria (1  percent). For imports in 1992,
material exchange continues to be played even  the main sources were Germany (15 percent),
nowadays.  With a population of 16 percent of  Italy  (12  percent),  Republic  of  Korea  (10
the FSU, Ukraine in 1993 (as shown in Table II)  percent)  and  former  Czechoslovakia  (10
absorbed  27  percent  of  total  imports  and  percent).  In  1993 trade outside the FSU was
contributed 15 percent of total exports in the  more diversified.  The largest trade surplus in
inter-republic  trade, in the face of sharp terms of  1993  cane  from  China,  whose  share  in
trade shocks.  About half of Russian  exports to  Ukraine's total exports reduced  sharply from 23
the FSU went to the Ukraine, which accounted  percent in 1992 to 9 percent in 1993. Notably,
for about three quarters of Ukraine's imports  trade  with  United  States,  Switzerland,  and
from the FSU  while two-thirds of Ukraine's  Austria expanded  significantly.
inter-republic  exports wentto Russia. Ukraine's
second  largest trade  partner  in  the  FSU  is
Belarus, accounting for  9.5  percent and  6.65
Table  IV  share  of capital  goods  declined. Noticeable  is
Tabl  TVthe  jump in value terms of the share  of energy
Ukraine:  Structure of Extemal Trade  from  less  than  one-seventh  of imports  in 1991  to
-----------------------  - -------- ----  --------  almost  a half in 1992. The share of crude oil
1991  1992  1993  rose  from  4.5 percent  in 1991  to 24.7 percent  in
----------------------  ----------  ------------  1992,  even  though  the volume  of oil imports  fell
In US$  Billion  by more 20 percent. On the export side, the
Balance  -3.4  -0.6  -1.7  share of ferrous metallurgy  in total earnings
FSU  -0.7  -1.1  -3.3  from  the  FSU more than doubled from 14
ROW  -2.7  0.S  1.6  percent in 1991  to 30 percent  in 1992,  while  the
Exports  50.0  11.3  14.9  share of  machine building fell in  1992 to  24
FSU  42.7  5.3  8.6  percent in 1992 from 42 percent in 1991.
ROW  7.3  6.0  6.3
Imports  53.4  11.9  16.6
FSU  43.4  6.4  11.9  TableV
ROW  10.0  5.5  4.7  Ukraine:  Composition  of Inter-republic  Trade
As  % of  GDP  (As % of Total  Trade Values)
Exports  39.9  9.9  15.69.9-
FSU  34.1  4.7  9.0  Export  Imports
ROW  5.8  5.3  6.6  1991 1992 1991 1992
Imports  42.6  10.4  17.4  Consumer  Goods 23.4 13.1 19.1  8.7
PSU  34.6  5.6  12.5  Food  11.2  7.1  2.6  1.6
ROW  8.0  4.8  5.0  Non-Food  12.2  6.0 16.5  7.1
Real Growth  Rates in  e  Energy
Exports  -18.6  -16.0  Crude  Oil  4.5 24.7
FS13  -18.3  -18.2  Oil  Products  0.5  0.6  3.2  6.3
ROW  -20.3  - 3.0  Gas  0.8  1.2  6.3 13.2
Imports  -25.6  -23.4  Capital  Goods &
FSU  -20.7  -24.8  Intermediate  Materials
ROW  -47.2  -14.1  Metallurgy  16.4 33.4 10.7  8.9
------------------------------------  chemicals  6.8  7.7 11.4  7.4
Sources: Ukranian  authorities and staff calculations  Machinery  41.8 24.2  31.4  11.8
Light  Industry  2.9  0.6  5.6  0.5
Sources: IMP, 1993  Cauntiy Review:  Ukmine
The broad trade pattern in 1991 and  -
1992  is summarized  in Table  IV.  Vis-a-vis  the
FSU,  Ukraine's  imports and  exports in  real
terms declined in  1993 by  18 percent and 25
percent, respectively.  Vis-a-vis the rest of the  Over half of Ukraine's industrial assets
world, there was a 20 percent volume decrease  were designed to produce military equipment.
in exports and 47 percent volume decrease in  Much of  the technology is  inappropriate for
imports in  1992.  Exports to  the rest  of the  current demand pattens.  Incentive distortions
world fell only slightly in 1993. Currendy, the  exist pervasively due to  price controls, state
changes in relative prices and in the demand-  order, foreign exchange  surrender requirements,
supply relations within the FSU have reshaped  and restrictive trade and income policies. This,
Ukraine's trade composition significantly.  On  together  with  an  unstable foreign  exchange
the import side of inter-republic  trade, the share  regime,  weakens  Ukraine's  position  in  the
of raw materials increased sharply, while the  international  market  competition.  As  the6
economy  moves  towards  market  orientation,  the  General lack  of  confidence in  the
trade pattern is expected to  change to better  economy  has lead to capital flight.  Estimates
reflect Ukraine's comparative  advantages. In  suggest  that  this was abouit  US$1  to 2 billion in
addition,  Ukraine  can expect to generate  some  1993. The Russian  ruble has been  appreciating
foreign exchange earnings from gas and oil  against Karbovantsi  steadily  and rapidly since
transits  at a reasonable  domestic  resource  cost 7. mid 1993. The Karbovanets  has fallen  from par
However,  at least, over the medium  term  it  with the Ruble  in early 1992  to 18  to one by the
would  seem  that  traditional  trading  partners  will  end of  1993. Consequently,  many Ukrainian
continue  to play  a major role.  enterprises  keep  holding  rubles  in contravention
of the 100  percent  ruble  surrender  requirements
regulated  by the government.  The broad thrust
2.3  Institutional Framework  and  Basic  of these policies  results in a strong anti-export
Policies  for International  Trade  bias.
Trade policies in  Ukraine have been  At the  moment, there is  not a  very
generally  geared  to protect  domestic  markets  and  supportive  milieu  for trade. The large number
mitigate the impacts of differentials  between  of relatively  opaque  government  regulations  are
domestic  prices  and  international prices.  a major barrier to potential  investors  together
Intergovernmental  bilateral arrangements  and  with what is perceived  as a broadly  inadequate
inter-enterprise  barter' continue  to be the main  legal system. In terms of what is needed, one
means  of exchange. All enterprises  are required  might consider the one-stop shop found in a
to surrender  50 percent  of their  foreign  exchange  number  of Asian countries  as an objective. In
earnings  at the fixed  exchange  rate  artificially  set  order to jump start the export  effbrt, one might
by the government. Recent  work  by Kaufnann  complement  the broad  policies  by one or more
(1994)  has  indicated how  high  surrender  export  processing  zones. These  zones have  the
requirements  result  in adverse  effects  on exports  advantage of  also  allowing more  careful
and overall  government  receipts.  monitoring  and  containment of  possible
corruption  influences.7
m.  Sources of External  Shocks
Many external  factors  exerted a direct  energy consumption  by residential  households
impact  on the economy  of Ukraine.  In this  and industrial  users.  Lack of financial  incentive
section, four major shocks are identified  and  for energy  conservation  also encourages  energy
analyzed.  waste. Second, Ukraine heavily denends on
jmorted  Mng.  Domestic  energy  production
3.1  Energy  Price Shocks  (mainly  coal and electricity)  could satisfy less
than half of total domestic  energy  consumption
Ukraine is  currently facing  severe  (47 percent in 1992 and 48 percent in 1993).
energy  price  shocks,  whose  impacts are  About  81 percent  of gas and 90 percent  of oil
pervasive and permanent.  Prices for energy  (including  oil products)  consumed  in Ukraine  in
imported  from the FSU region did not reflect  1993 were imported from the FSU region,
either  the  production cost nor the markes  mainly Russia. Kazakhstan  and Turkmenistan.
conditions  for supply and demand, and were  Third, Ukraine's  energy  efficiency  has continued
only a fraction  of the comparable  world market  ,tO driooate.  Ukraine's  total prinmary  energy
prices. For instance,  prices  of oil and  gas from  consumption  decreased  by about  9 percent and
the FSU region in 1991 were estimated  to be  12 percent in  1992 and 1993-in comparison
about  34  percent and  46  percent of  the  with GDP fall of  14 percent and 18 percent
corresponding world  levels.  After  the  respectively--indicating  that  energy intensity
disintegration  of the FSU  in 1991,  Russia  sought  worsened. Continued  soft-budget  constraints  in
to remove  its implicit  energy  subsides  to FSU  state-owned  enterprises  contributed  to energy
republics,  to raise energy  prices to the world  misuses  and  payment  problems.  Fourth,
levels,  and  to reduce  energy  exports  if payments  domestic  energy  prices are seriously  distorted.
were not promptly  made.  These movements  Prices of coal were far below the production
enlarged Ukraine's energy bill  to  Russia,  cost, while  the average  price of natural  gas was
depressed Ukraine's import capacities, and  only about 35  percent of  the corresponding
resulted  in a sizeable  trade deficit with Russia  import  cost in 1993. On a calorific  equivalent
and  compressed  domestic  economic  activities.  basis, fuel  oil  was about four  time  more
expensive than natural gas in  the  domestic
Structural  weakness  makes  the  Ukrainian  market  in March  1994,  while  electricity  was  sold
economy  highly  vulnerable  to energy  shocks  in  at a  price 20  percent below financial costs.
forms of price  hikes  and supply  cut-offs. First,  Though  domestic  prices  of oil products  reached
the economy is very enemy intensive.  An  the world  leels  in early 1994,  energy  supply  to
international  energy  efficiency  comparison  (see  households  is still  heavily  subsidized,  providing
Zheng  et al 1994),  -in terms  of kilograms  of oil  little incentives  for energy conservation.  In
equivalent  required  to produce  one US  dollar of  addition,  soft  budget constraints of  state
GDP-,  shows that while Ukraine's energy  enterprises  and the fear of possible  extensive
intensity  is similar to that in some  historically  bankruptcy make  fee  collection a  serious
socialist  countries (such  as  Romania and  problem for  domestic energy suppliers and
Bulgaria),  it is double  that of Hungary,  triple  energy  misuse  difficult  to abate. Finally,  er
that of Argentina.  four times as high as that in  imports  from FSU sources  are becoming  more
Mexico  and Turkey,  and  ten times as high as in  expensive  and uncertain. Bilateral  agreements
France,  Spain  and  Austria. As  can  be seen  from  between  governments  are the principal  channels
their  preliminary  regression  analysis,  the system  for Ukraine  to obtain desired  energy imports.
factor associated  with central planning  is the  Ukraine's tenns of energy trade deteriorated
major  cause  of energy  inefficiency.  One of the  remarkably.  Crude  oil imports  was compressed
reasons is the  heavily subsidized  prices for  by 43 percent  from 35 million  tons in 1992  to8
20  million  tons  in  1993.  Moreover,  gas  electricity  production  in  1990  and  1993
suppliers  in  Russia  and  Turkmnenistan have  respectively, is associated with significant safety
repeatedly threatened to suspend gas deliveries  hazards.  The  plentiful  coal  deposits  are
unless  Ukraine  could  manage  to  reduce  its  considered damaging to  the environment, and
arrears on payments for energy imports.  most  coal  mines  are  costly  to  rehabilitate.
Moreover,  the productivity of  Ukraine's  coal
The  magnitude  of  the  energy  price  industry is declining sharply, as demonstrated by
shocks are substantial.  As shown in Table VII,  an output fall of 14.4 percent in  1993 together
the  import  prices of  oil  and  gas  in  1993 in  with a 9 percent increase in employment.  One
nominal terms were about 1,080 times and 565  could envisage alternate energy suppliers over
times as high as those in  1991.  In real terms,  the medium term as Ukraine extends its regional
these  two  multipliers  stood  at  6.9  and  3.6,  connections but this is unlikely to be significant
respectively.  The import price of Russian gas  for at least a few years.
rose from about 12 percent of the comparable
inernational  level (the price of Russian gas in  Tabl  VI
the Western European market adjusted by transit  a  I
cost) in  1992 to 60 percent in  1993, while the  UTkraine: Energy  Imports  from  FSU
import price of Russian oil rose from 35 percent
in  1992 to  76  percent  in  1993.  A  rough  Unit  1991  1992  1993
estimate indicates  that Ukraine's terms of energy  --  -----------------------
trade deteriorated by about 76 percent in  1992  Volume
and  by  a  further  9  percent  in  1993.  CrudeOil  m. ton  51.1  34.1  19.6
Consequently,  the value share of energy imports  Gas  bcm  89.5  89m.  6  79 .8
in  the total  imports  from  the FSU  area was  Rusia  77.1  54.3  49.2
raised from 14 percent in 1991 to 46 percent in  Turkmenistan  12.5  25.5  25.6
1992,  and  then to  53  percent  in  1993.  As
percentage of GDP,  energy  imports from  the  Price Indexes
FSU increased from 3.6 percent in 1991 to 14.4  Crude Oil  100  9381  75241
percent  in  1992 and then  to  15.6 percent  in  Oil Products  100  11335  92642
1993.  Price hikes on energy imports resulted in  Gas
a very large energy trade deficit vis-a-vis  the  Russia  100  2070  47490
FSU, which was increased by US$3.4 billion in  Tuenistan  100  20SS  36821
1993 in spite of 36 percent  volume fall in oil  Pces  as % of World levels
imports and  I1  percent  volume  fall  in  gas  Crude Oil  33  5  35.4  75.7
imports.  Gas  45.6  12.3  S6.1
The  permanent  nature  of  the  energy  Sources:  UTkainian  authorities
shocks calls for significant structural adjustments
and  energy efficiency improvement, since the
potential  of  self-sufficiency  in  energy  and
alternative energy supply is seriously limited in
the near future.  Lack of hard currency and port  3.2  Non-Energy  Tenms of Trade  Shocks
facilities  to  handle  bulk  shipments  prevents
Ukraine from importing energy from alternative  The  terms  of  trade  (TO0T)  is
sources.  At the same time alternative domestic  conventionally defined as the ratio between the
energy  sources  have  their  own  problems.  unit  value  of  exports  and  the  unit  value of
Nuclear power generation, which accounted for  imports.'  The  impact  on  the  balance  of
about  26  percent  and  34  percent  of  total  payments due to  changes in terms-of-trade of9
non-energy tradable are based on variations in  3.3  Market Disintegration Shocks
prices and quantities  of exports and imports each
year.  The breakup of the FSU was followed
____________________________by  sharp  declines  in  trade  among  newly
Table VU  ~~~~~~independent  republics.  Deterioration  of
Table VII  ~~~~~~~macroeconomic  conditions in the former Soviet
Ukraine:  Terms  of Trade  with FSUJ  Union reduced the availability of raw material
--  supply as inputs while at the same time led to
(1991  =100.0)  1992  1993  reduced marker demand for Ukrainian output.
- --------  ---- Initial  estimates  show  that  in  volume,  inter-
Non-Ener-gy  TOT  94.8  87.4  republic trade shrank by two thirds within three
Unit Value  of Imports  1430  14840  yasfo  90t  93
Unit Value  of Exports  1360  12970  yasfo  90t  93
Energy (Oil & Gas) TOT  24.4  22.2  Table VWI
Unit Value  of  Imports  5950  71620
Russian  GDP Deflator  1450  15890  Trend  of Inter-republic  Trade: 1990-93
At Constant  1990)  Rubles
Aggngate  TOT  VL 4  52.7Billions  1990  1991  1992  1993
Annual  TOT Change  in  %  --------------------
Aggregate  -37.6  -15.5  Exports  189.3  141.2  93.2  72.1
Non-Energy  -5.2  -7.8  Index (1)  100.0  74.6  49.2  38.2.
Entergy  -75.6  -9.2  imports  188.5  129.0  99.9  74.6
_______________________________Index  (1)  100.0  68.4  53.0  39.6
Source:  Staff  calculations.  Russia
Exports  74.7 58.8  42.6  31.9
Together with volume shrinking in the  Index (1-)  100.0  78.7  57.0  42.7
Imports  67.3  42.9  40.1  27.1
inter-republic  trade,  prices  of inputs  to  Index (M)  100.0  63  .7  59.6  40.3
production  increased  sharply. 10 In  addition  to
energy,  significant  price  increases  were  also  Ukrainie
Exports  38.3  27.3  18.9  14.4
recorded  on  the  import  side  for  iron,  steel,  afld  Index (1)  100.0  71.3  49.4  37.5
nonferrous  metal  products.  However,  prices  of  Share (1-) 20.2 19.3  20.3  20.0
Ukraine's  major  exports  in  the  FSU  market  imports  39.0  33.0  23.7  12.6
declined  remarkably.  For instance,the prices of  sharex  (O1)  0.7  25.6  23.7  16.9
machinery  and agricultural  products,  relative  to  Share  VO  20.7  25.__23_7_16_9
the  corresponding  world  prices,  dropped  by  22  Source: Figures  for 1990-1997,  see NMioaopoulos,
percent  and  73  perc6nt,  respectively.  As  a  page  27.  Figure for 1993  arc staff  estimftes.
result,  Ukraine's non-energy  terms-of-trade  with
the  FSU deteriorated by 5.2 percent  and  7.8
percent in 1992 and 1993, respectively.  The marketing prospects for Ukrainian
output  faces  many  difficulties.  During  the
Ukraine's terms-of-trade with the rest of  Soviet era, Ukraine was heavily industrialized.
the world can be expected  to imnprove  over time,  Most  of  its  industrial  assets  were  oriented
when  exporters  adopt  international  trade  directly or  indirectly for  military production.
practices  and  improve  the  quality  of  their  This poses many difficulties  in reorienting output
products.  and especially in the allocation of the labor force
during the transition phase.10
The ratio of imports  to the output in  primarily  trough  two  channels:  arrear
production ranged from 20  percent to  30  accumulation  and technical  credits.  Some of
percent. However,  these imports  permeate  the  them were subsequently  capitalized  into state
whole economy  so that about 80 percent of  debts  denominated  in US dollars. A large part
production  in Ukraine  requires  some levels of  of Ukraine's  current  account  deficit  in 1992  and
inputs produced  elsewhere in the FSU.  As  the first quarter  of 1993, valued  at Ruble 1.05
shown in Table  VIII, both imports  and exports  trillion,  was converted  in May 1993  into a debt
of Russia,  the largest  market  for Ukraine,  fell by  of US$2.5  billion  at market  interest  rate  (LIBOR
about  60% during  last three years.  for  six-month US dollar deposits plus one
percentage  point).  Amortization  and interest
Ukraine's  agricultural products and  payments  are to be made quarterly  over the six
consumer goods can be expected  to  achieve  year period 1994-99. Debt service may be
significant  export  levels  over the medium  term.  discharged  in convertible  currencies  or rubles  at
Presently  these  efforts  are  hampered  by a lack  of  the exchange rate prevailing on  the date of
physical and  financial infrastructure.  [f  payment, or  in  equity  in  real  property.
macroeconomic  stability  and  systemic  Apparently,  repaying  these debts  constitutes  an
transformation  in the former  socialist  countries  additional  shock  to th economy.  There has also
in East  Europe  and Central  Asia  can  be achieved  been some  discussions  about  the possibility  for
at a reasonable  pace, Ukraine  will benefit  from  Russia to swap the trade arrears with equity
the recovery  and the increasing  trade  volume.  rights, most noticeably  on the Black Sea Fleet
and gas transit  pipelines.
3.4  ExcessDemand  forExtemral  ancing
The sizele  trade deficit  with the FSU
area, notably  Russia,  was financedLI
IV.  Impacts  of and  Responses  to  External  Shocks
This  section briefly outlines a  simple  import prices from that in the previous period.
computational  approach  of decomposing  external  Table  I  in  the  Annex  presents  numerical
shocks, estimating their impacts on the current  estimates of the energy price effects.
account,  and  assessing  the  economy's
performance responses to  the external shocks.
Conventionally,  the  impact  of  unfavorable  4.1.2  Non-Energy Terms of Trade  Effect
shocks are registered as positive values in our
study.  The time index in the text is suppressed  The  net  effect  of  terms-of-trade
(except  in  some  time-lag  cases)  for  variations,  TTE,  is  usually  taken  as  the
presentational purpose.  difference between the impacts of price changes
in  imports,  TME,  and  in  exports,  TXE.
Namely,
4.1.  Impacts  of External  Shocks  =  - (2)
Four  types  of  external  shocks  are
considered  critical  in  the  Ukraine's  BOP  where the superscript,  r,  is the  region index,
imbalance: (1) Energy Price Effect,  (2) Non-  which can be the FSU and the rest of the world
energy  Terms  of  Trade  Effect,  (3)  Export  (ROW).  The import price effect, TME, can be
'Volune Effect, and (4) Interest Impact of Extra-  derived as
Financing.  They are analyzed in turn.  = QM;(PM; - PM1 )  (3)
4.1.1  Energy Price Effect  where QM and PM are the volume and the unit
price of non-energy imports from region r.  The
Ukraine is a net energy importer, except  same formula applies to the export price effect,
for some electricity exchanges and coal exports.  TXE.  Simple substitutions lead to
It purchases gas and oil from Russia and gas
from Turkmenistan.  Since energy trade outside
the FSU does not account for a significant  share  TIE, = nr,f'1 +  7 ,wr
in the total trade, it is treated toeether with non-
energy merchandises in calculatio.z.  The effect  =  QM,U(PMrU-PMfin
of energy price changes, EPE, can be written as
EPE*  =  Q0,(PO,  - PO, 1)  QX,  (pX,  _PXi)  (4)
+  QG(Pg,  - PG,I)  (1)  + QM,`(PjM,  oPMri)
+  QrG[(PGrfP  - &  - Pcr  mow  nor
where QO and PO are the import volume and
price of oil, QG and PG are import volume and  Hence, the terms-of-rade effects across
price of gas, respectively.  The superscripts R  regions can offset each other when prices move
and T on gas imports index exporting sources,  in  different  directions.  The  current  trade
namely Russia and Turkmanistan.  A positive  volumes are  used  as  the  weights,  which are
value of EPE represents an opportunity loss in  updated over time.  Price deviations are always
energy  import  values  caused by  changes of  relative to the immediately  preceding year.  One
limitation of  this  calculation is  that  a  strict12
terms-of-trade deterioration may not necessarily  mitigate  the  impact  of  the  external  shocks.
lead  to  an  adverse  (positive)  impact on  the  While this practice shift the impacts of current
balance of payments, when the volume weight  shocks into the future, it places further burden
on  export  is  significantly  greater  than  the  on  the  current  account  in the  future  through
volume-weight on  imports.  Table  2  in  the  compounding interest liabilities.  Denote the net
Annex presents numerical estimates for the non-  extra  financing at time  t-lI as  NEFt., and the
energy terms-of-trade effect in Ukraine.  applicable  interest  rate  as  i  ,  then  the  total
additional interest payments due, AIP, shall be
4.1.3  Export  Volume Effect  AIP, = iNEF,_>  (6)
Here  we concentrate on the impact of  Thus current shocks are channelled into
fluctuations of demand for  Ukrainian exports.  the near future by forcing foreign savings.  If
The export volume effect, EVE. is calculated as  such extraordinary borrowing is relied on for a
the difference in value of exports if economies  long period, say j years, the cumulative interest
of  trade  partners  grew  normally,  say  at  the  impact will be
world  average  growth  rate,  gW, and  the  actual
value  of  exports,  taking  the  change  in  the  MPt  =  £,4N.pl
income  elasticity  of  demand  for  Ukrainian  j  I
exports,  71,  into consideration. Hence,  + sII  (1  +,-1)  NEF>]
EVE[, =  PX,'Q2X,'11(xj4&g7 _  T8,r  (5)  I-I  k-I
This interest  impact can be  substantial
Therefore,  if the importers'  economies  through  accumulation  over  time  if  no
grow at the same pace  as the world economy  performance improvement is conducted to offset
and the demand elasticity does not change, there  the unfavorable shocks.
should be no export volume effects for Ukraine.
Meanwhile,  the  trade  partners  may  diversify
their imports away from Ukraine, as most FSU  4.2.  Responses  to  External  Shocks
republics  currently  tend  to  integrate  their
economies into the world trading system.  This  Among  many reacting  measures,  five
trade diversification, which can be represented  types  of  performance  responses  are  analyzed
by a shrinking vq,  is assumed to take effect in the  here:  (1) Improvements in  Service Accounts;
medium to long run.  In our calculation for the  (2)  Economic  Compression;  (3)  Export
most recent past and the nearest future, we take  Expansion; (4)ImportSubstitution/Compression;
a  constant unit  elasticity,  directly channelling  and  (5)  Additional  Borrowing/Arrear
effects  of  foreign  growth  into  trade  quantity  Accumulation.
impacts for Ukraine.  Numerical estimates of the
export volume effects are presented in Table 3
of the Annex.  4.2.1  Improvements  in Services Accounts
One  potential  sustainable  source  of
4.1.4  Cumulative  Interest  Inpact  of Extra-  foreign exchange for Ukraine is the gas transit
Financng  revenue.  The additional gains  in the services
account, ISA, can be written as
Lack of adequate domestic adjustments
forces  Ukraine to  accumulate payment arrears
and  seek  additional  foreign  borrowing  to13
account of BOP will be mitigated.  We use the
ISA, - (TRF;-TRF,.i)QGT,.  lfollowing  formula to calculate EEE:
+  TRF,(  QGT,  - QGT, 1)  (8)  [A  ,r
~(OS  O&  )  EEE,'  = PX,'QX,'  QX-  xg;  (10)
+(OSA,-OSAt_,)  QX'SI
where TRF and QGT are the unit transit fee and  where xg' is the export growth rate in region r.
the total quantity of gas transit, respectively.  However, if Ukraine's exports grow slower  than
The last bracket on the right hand side contains  those of its trade partners, EEE will then be
changes in other services accounts, OSA.  For  negative, showing a relatively poor response to
instance, as Ukraine is located between Europe  external shocks.
and  Russia,  income  from  cross-country
transports  could  be  expected  to  increase
significantly as normal trade relations resume.  4.2.4  Import SubstitutionlCompression
ln addition, Ukraine has good potential to earn
foreign exchange  from tourism development.  The  economy  can  also  respond  to
external shocks by reducing  its imports through
changing  its import intensity of per unit of real
4.2.2  Economic Compression  GDP, which is usually captured in the income
elasticity  of imports, 0.  If imports  did not grow
Domestic  income  declines induce  falls in  in  ieality  as  in  the  assumed "normal" case,
demand  for  foreign  goods.  The  effect  of  where a constant import intensity is kept, then
economic compression, EEC, can be calculated  the economy induced import substitution or its
as  imports  were  compressed  by  technical
difficulties, such as payments problems.  This
EEC,r  = PM[  QMT2  1 en  - gt")  (9)  effect of  import substitution (compression),
EIS, can thus be calculated  as
where  0  is  Ukraine's  income  elasticity  of
imports, and g" is the GDP (income)  growth rate  =  QM,'
in Ukraine. With a given elasticitv, the import  EIS[ = PM,'QM,  - QM4
volume  will  be  reduced  if  the  economic
compression  takes  place, as compared  with what
is expected to be the "normal" case (here we
take the world average GDP growth rate as a
reference).  4.3  Filling the Gap: Additional Borrowing
and Forced Foreign Savings
4.2.3  Export Expansion  Ukraine's external gap, after taking all
active and passive reactions to external shocks
The effect of export expansion, EEE,  into  consideration,  was  filled  mainly  by
measures the impact generated from Ukraine's  extraordinary  financing,  namely  additional
export promotion efforts.  Simnply  speaking, if  borrowing  (including  overdraws  in  the
trade  policies  encourage  exports  and  thus  corresponding  accounts)  and  arrear
Ukraine's export grows in real terms faster than  accumulation.  This part of foreign financing
export growth of  its  trade competitors, then  works, ex post, as a balancing item to equalize
Ukraine's  shares in overseas markets will be  the impacts of external  shocks and the effects of
enlarged and the trade deficit in  the current  r2sponses in the current account of Ukraine's14
balance of payments.  Hence, we can measure  Tabl  IX
the effect of the net external financing, NEF, as  a  e
the following (a residual in our calculation):  Tkraine:  Impact  of External  Shocks
NEF, =EPE 1 +7MgE  EVE,  + AIP?  (12{  (in % of GDP)
1992  1993
-lSAt  - EEC,-  EEE,-  EWSt  ------------------------------------
Aggregate  Impact  14.22  13.01
Energy  Price Effect  13.39  13.75
4.4  Coping  with  External  Shocks:  Crude  Oil  7.37  3.48
Numerical  Results  Oil  Products  1.69  1.39 Gas  4.32  8.87
Russia  3.71  6.45
Using the methodology outlined above,  Turkmenistan  0.62  2.42
one can obtain the numerical results on impacts
of external shocks as presented in Table IX.  It  NoneE  Tems of  -344  -3.44
is noted that most of the shocks came from the  Trade Effects
FSU.  The broad picture is that the energy price  Import  Price  Effect 13.55  11.01
effect was strongly unfavorable, especially due  Export  Price  Effect  16 As8  14.45
to oil price hikes in 1992 and gas price hikes in  With  ROW  0.00  -0.01
1993.  The fall in export demand in the FSU  Import  Price  Effect  0.00  0.00
also  exerted  a  significant  unfavorable  but  Export  Price  Effect  0.00  0.01
somewhat smaller  impact.  The  non-energy
terms of  trade  had a  favorable but moderate  TotEeTerm-of-Trade  9.  10.3
impact, although the non-energy terms of trade  Effect with FSU
themselves  deteriorated considerably  in 1992  and  Export  Volume  Effect  4.27  2.63
1993.  FSTJ  4.29  2.64
ROW  -0.02  -0  0  1
Liability  from°  0.00  0.08
Additional  Financing
Source:  Staff  calculations
How did the economy respond to these
shocks?  The numerical estimates on different
responses are presented in Table X.  Among a
variety of measures  the government adopted, the
primary one was to resort to stronger controls.
In  both  years  of  1992 and  1993,  economic
compression reduced Ukraine's import capacity
and the import volume fell significantly, which
accounted for  nearly  one  third  of  the  total
response impacts.  However, in 1992, the main
response was  to  induce import  compression
through  economic retrenchment  and  import
substitution. Export promotion may also played15
a  moderate  role.  However.  in  1993.  the  Ukraine can be better positioned to cope
principal response  was increased reliance on  with future external shocks if it conducts a set of
external financing. Moreover, in  1993, export  trade  policies  consistent with  macroeconomic
promotion was not used as a policy option.  The  stabilization, structural adjustments and revival
anti-export  bias in policies was reflected  not only  of Ukraine's  comparative advantages.  These
in quantitative restriction on exports for a wide  shall  include,  among  many  other  measures,
range  of goods  but  also  through  the foreign  break state  controls of  foreign trade  by  de-
exchange  regime  which  forced  exporters  to  monopolization,  de-regulation,  and  private
surrendered 50 percent of their hard currency  participation;  and  remove  distortionary
earnings  at  an  official  exchange  rate.  T'he  incentives (such as foreign exchange surrender
official rate  was artificially set  and was only  requirements).  Recently positive moves have
one-third of the parallel market exchange rate in  been taken to reform the export regime.  With a
1993.  Predictably,  responses  to  these  presidential decree of May 5, 1994, the scope of
disincentives  was to  drive  signif"-ant export  administrative  controls  on  exports  has  been
activities  underground  and  encourage capital  significantly narrowed.  Quotas presenty apply
flight.  to slightly more than one hundred products that
account  for about one-third of total export value.
Table X  'The "special regime"  for strategic goods was
abolished and replaced by a system of quarterly
Ukraine: Performance Responses to Shocks  auctions of quotas.  All export taxes have been
(in '6 of Current GDP)  eliminated.  Moreover, Ukraine is the first CIS
------------------------------------  country to sign an "Agreement on Partnership
1992  1993  and  Cooperation"  with  the  European  Union,
------------------------------------  which  focuses on  support  and protection for
Aggregate  Response  14.22  13.- 01.  investments and the streamlining of policies for
Improvements  in  0 .00  1.86  the mining and raw materials sectors,  science
Service Accounts  and  technology,  agriculture,  energy  and  the
civilian nuclear industry. Under this agreement,
Economic  CoSresson  4 .40  4.578  members of the European Union and Ukraine
With  FSU  3 .03  3 .51
With ROW  1.37  1.27  will  grant each other most-favored  nation status,
guarantee the unrestricted and duty-free transit
hnport Substitution  6.55  1.  61  and  trade  of  goods  via  their  territories.
and Intensity  Merchandise trade  will  take  place  at  market
FSU  3.26  1.89  prices.
ROW  3.29  -0.28
Export  Promotion  2.94  -2.76
FSU  1.59  -2  00
ROW  1.35  -0.75
Extraordinary  0.33  7.52
Financing
Source: Staff calculations16
V.  Learning  from  International  Experiences
Ukraine has  experienced some  of  the  economic  efficiency  was  not  sufficiently
most severe adverse shocks of any country not  improved.  Ukraine can  certainly  learn from
at war.  While policy analysis must inevitably  these  international  experiences,  and  avoid
reflect  the  particular  socio-political  and  repeating mistakes of other countries.
economic realities in the country of subject, it is
also of interest to examine similar, albeit not as
severe, situations in other countries.  There is  5.1.1  Greece
now a wide range of experiences in how various
countries have addressed external shocks. Given  Greece is interesting in the sense that the
that there is no unique approach in how best to  politics tended to be fairly sharply divided. This
deal with various types of shocks a review of  led to severe difficulties for policy makers who
selected country experiences can be very useful  generally were unable to obtain critical support
and relevant.  for measures, especially if they involved short
term sacrifices by some of the more important
In  this  section  we  briefly  review  groups.
experiences  of  a  number  of  countries".
Summary details are given in Tables XI through  Shocks.  Greece  being  an  energy
XV.  In the Annex, for each of these selected  importer suffered adverse effects from the two
countries one table is produced, containing two  oil shocks of 1970s equivalent to about 8 percent
parts.  The first part lists magnitudes of shocks  of GDP in each instance.
experienced  each  year  and  the  performance
response to  them.  The second  part presents  Performance  Response.  The general
selected  economic  indicators which provide some  response in the seventies was to rely unduly on
indication of the policy measures adopted that  external borrowing.  Following the second oil
resulted in the performance measures listed.  shock the authorities sought to curtail monetary
expansion  but  failed  to  contain  fiscal
expenditures.  This was largely because of the
5.1  Country  Experiences  fragile political balance throughout this period.
Experiences  of  five  countries  that  Towards  the end  of the  decade fiscal
suffered significantly from external shocks in the  deficits continued to present a major difficulty.
past years are analyzed here.  Some of them,  However under prodding from the EEC (which
such as Korea and Portugal, are relatively more  provided  significant  transfers)  they  began to
successful  because  they  adopted  appropriate  address the problem.  The main pillars  of the
strategies to cope with the external shocks, and  economic  policy  program  now  are  fiscal
took  the  challenges  as  opportunities  to  adjustment and  structural  reform.  However,
restructure domestic industries and to integrate  while the monetary  adjustment seems to  have
their  previously  isolated  economies  into  the  started at the beginning the '90s, delays in the
world trade and finance systems.  Others, like  implementation of other structural reforms have
many African countries, did not manage to react  increased the overall burden of the adjustment
effectively, and thus still live in the shadow of  process.  This is leading to a slowdown of the
the  external  shocks.  There  are  also  some  economy and the increase in unemployment is
countries,  including  the  Philippines  and  placing serious strains on the authorities, further
Hungary, which started their adjustments in right  reducing the margin for maneuvering.
directions, but their actions were either poorly
designed or wealdy implemented, therefore their17
Table N-  achieve a truly competitive position. This is a
rather  complex  issue  that  would  require
Greece: Impacts of  extensive analysis. Thus the export performance
in the eighties was poor. The underlying causes
and  Responses  to External Shocks  are  a  combination of  factors. These  include
(Annual Average over thie  Period)  failure to  contain real exchange appreciation,
and  lack of  adequate incentives for  potential
72-75  76-80  81-85  86-91  entrepreneurs.  Ironically the  fiscal  "reform"
prior  to  the  breakup of the  FSU  may  have
Macroeconomic Indicators  (%)  resulted  in  a  negative  effect  as  the overall  tax
GDP Growth  4 .8  4 .3  1.3  1.7  burden  is  generally  perceived  as  being  too
Inflation(CPI)  15.0  16.4  20.7  17.8  heavy.
Budget Deficit/GDP  3.1  4.4  12.6  16.6
External  Debt/GDP  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a
Monetary  Expansion  6. 0  5.5  5.2  0.6  Table XI
(As % of GDP  at Current  Market  Prices)  Hugary:  Impacts of
Tmnacts  of External  Shocks  and Responses to External Shocks
Terms  of Trde  Effect  2.3  1.9  0.0  0.4  (Annual Average over the Period)
Export  Volume  Effect  0.3  0.1  0.2  -0.3
Intcrest Rate  Effect  n.a  n.a  n.a  nr. a
Addituonl  Debt  Services  0.1  0.7  1.-3  1.1725768  15  "
Total  2.7  2.7  1.6  1.2  7275  76-HO  81-85  86-91
Performnance  PResDonse  Macroeconomic Indicators C,
Export Promotion  1.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  GDP  Growth  6.5  3.3  1.8  -1.5
import intensity  -0.4  0.8  0.0  -2.0  Inflation  (CPI)  3.0  6.4  6.7  19.3
Economic Compression  0.5  0.4  0.7  0.0  Budget  Deficit/GDP  n..a  n.a  1.0  1.5
ExtraordinaryBorrowing  1.  6  1.6  0.9  3.1  Extemal  Debt/GDP  n.  a  46.6  52.0  70.0
Total  2.7  2.7  1.6  1.2  Monetary  Expansion  n.-a  n.ea  n.a  n.ea
Sources:  Staff  calculation.  (As X of GDP at Curent  Market Prices)
Impact! of External Shocks
Tern  of Trde  Effect  2.2  0.5  0  7  0  6
Export Volume Effect  1.4  0  2  0.6  -0 .9
Interest Rate Effect  n.a  n.ea  -0.2  -0.1
5.1.2  Hungary  Additionu Debt Services  -0.4  0.5  0  3  0.0
Total  3.2  1.3  1.4  -0.4
Shocks.  Hungary suffered from serious  -
terms-of-trade deterioration due to the two oil  Performance1  Resoonses
shocks.  ~~~~~~~~~Export  Promotion  1 .6  -2. 4  1.0O  -2.  1 shocks.  In,IportIntensity  0.5  2.6  0.3  -0.5
Econonic Compresion  -0.  4  1.1  1.  0  0.9
Policy Response.  Hungary presents a  ErordaryEorrowig  1.4  0.0  -1.0  1.2
number  of  problems  for  the  policy  analyst.  Total  3.2  1.3  1.4  -0.4
From one perspective  they have undergone  many
years  of reform  and  restructuring.  However  it  Sourc2s Staff calculaton.
does not yet seem to have achieved its expected
potential.
At the same time Hungary relied unduly
Much of  this  somewhat disappointing  on external finance during the seventies. In the
performance may be attributed to its failure to  early eighties world interest rates rose sharply so18
the  required  servicing  became  unduly  acceleration  in  inflation  wage  increases were
burdensome.  moderated.
This external debt has been a continuing  As the global economy recovered in the
burden for the authorities and has limited their  eighties  Korea  was  well placed  for  a  strong
room to maneuver.  export performance.  At  the same  time  they
reduced their  external debt burden  so that by
1990 it was less than 15 percent of GDP.
S.1.3  Korea
Evidently, Korea provides an example of  Table XI
one of the more successful countries.  There are  Korea:  Impacts of
many  explanations available  for  this  success
ranging from  those  who highlight their  swift  and Responses to Extemral  Shocks
adoption of market principles to the advocates of  (Annual Average over the Period)
industrial policy who tend to emphasize the role
of such instruments  as directed  credits to certain  72-75  76-80  81-85  86-91
industries.  Perhaps  the  best way to characterize
Korean policy is that it is pragmatic, flexible and  Macroeconomic  Indicators (WI
does not readily  lend itself  to one form  or other  GDP Growth  9.4  7.9  8.5  9.8
of ideological  bent.  Inflation (CPI)  16.1  17.4  7.3  6.2
Budget Deficit/GDP  2.1  1.7  2.0  D.0
Shocks.  Korea  experienced  severe  External Debt/GDP  29.2  36.7  48.8  23.1
adverse  effects  from  the  first  and  second  oil  Monetary  Expansion 13.4  14.0  12.1  12.8
shocks.  In  each  instance these  accounted for
about  10 percent  of GDP.  (As f  of GDP  at Current  Market  Prices) Impacts  of External  Shocks
Teamsof Trade Effec  3.0  1.4  -0.4  -0.4
Policy  Response.  The  response  to  the  Export  Volume Effect  0.7  0.2  0.5  -0.7
first oil shock was to move to export-led  growth.  interest  Rate  Effect  0.0  0.1  -0.2  -0.o0
This  was  largely  accomplished  by  AddiiionlfDebtServices  -0.1  -0.1  -0.5  -1.0
macroeconomic  stabilization,  neutral  trade  Total  3.6  1.6  -0.6  -2.1
regime, and selective incentives.  This resulted
in a  depreciation of the real exchange rate to  erfor ance Reso n2  0  1 . . ~~~~~~Export  Promotion  3 .5  2 .2  3.0O  1 .4
support  competitiveness.  tmport  Intensity  0 .2  -0.7  -0.4  -0.9
Economic  Compreion  0.1  0.6  -0.2  -0.5
Following  the second  shock  and  the  ExtmordinaryBorrowing  -0.3  -0.6  -3.1  -2.2
accompanying  slowdown  in the global  economy  Total  3.6  1.6  -0.6  -2.1
the  response  was  initially  to  curb  domestic  u-e:  S
growth by  restricting imports.  At this time  Sources:  Stff  calculaton.
domestic fuel prices were adjusted upwards and
the growth of the money supply was tightened.
This  drove  up  interest  rates  and  created
problems for  Korean firms  which historically  5.1.4  Philippines
tended to  have high debt/equity ratios.  As die
growth  rate  stalled  in  the  early  eighties  the  The Philippines is sometimes viewed as
authorities  then  decided  to  move to  a  more  a Latin American style country in the middle of
expansionary policy.  In order  to forestall  an  the successful East Asian countries.19
Shocks.  The  Philippines experienced  term expansion they failed to yield the expected
severe  adverse  oil  shocks  in  the  seventies.  returns  over  time.  The  government  deficit
When the global economy recovered to some  continued to expand and the real exchange rate
extent in the eighties the Philippines was not  appreciated. Eventually the policy moved to a
able to take advantage  of the situation like many  strong  contraction  and  uncertain  political
of its neighbors.  situation.
Table XIV  In the late nineties they got some help in
addressing the external debt burden and moved
Philippines: Impacts of  towards a more stable situation.
and Responses to External Shocks
(Annual Average over the Period)  5.1.5  Portugal
72-75  76-80  81-85  86-91  Portugal faced a variety of problems as
--------  it sought to  restructure  its  economy from  an
Macroeeonomic  Indicators  (%)  inward looking one under the tightly controlled
GDP Growth  5 . 8  6.  0  -1.2  3  7  regime of Salazar to moving to integration wit
Inflation  (CPI)  16.4  12.4  21.4  9.7  the world economy and becoming a member of
BudgetDeficit/GDP n.a  nr.a  5.3  2.8  the EEC.
ExtenalDebt/GDP  20.7  43.4  72.5  77.5
Monetary  Expansion  -1.5  9.2  -2.3  8 .6  Siocks.  As an energy importer Portugal
had adverse effects of about 10 per cent of GDP
(As % of GtDP  at Current Market Prices)  due  to  the first  and  second  oil  shocks.
Impacts or Extenal  Shocks
Tcrms of Trade Effect  2.1  1.2  0.2  0 .4
Expert Volumc Effect  0.5  0.1  0.3  -0.4  Performance  Response.  Portugal
Interest Rate Effect  0.0  0.1  - 0.2  -0.1  initially sought to borrow externally to offset the
Additional  Debt  Services  0 .1  0.9  2.0  1 .4  impact  of  the  first  oil  shock.  However
Total  2.8  2.4  2  2  1.4  following  the  second  shock  they  sought  to
Perfornanmce  Responses  strengthen  their  export  performance.  They
Export  Promotion  -0.6  0.5  -0.5  0.3  enjoyed  some success at export promotion as
Import Intensity  0.3  -0.1  1.3  -0.7  their  real exchange rate depreciated.  Indeed,
Economic Compression  -0.1  -0  2  1.4  -0  -8  Portugal's exports recorded continuous gains in
Extraordinary  Borrowing  3 . 1  2.2  0.0  2.6  market share during the 1980s.
Total  2 . 8  2.4  2.2  1.4
Sources:  Staff  calculation.  As  the  budget  deficit  increased  in  the
Sus:tfclltnmid-eighties they sought to tighten monetary and
fiscal policy.  This is reflected in the successful
Performance  Response.  The  reduction of the budget deficit which declined
performance response to the first oil shock was  from 15 percent to 5 percent between 1985 and
to increase external borrowing.  Much of the oil  1989.  The slowdown in growth in the mid-
price  increase  was  not  passed  along  to  eighties also helped the current account through
consumers.  This continued to be the case even  the fall in imports.  The extemal debt was also
after  the  second  oil  shock.  The  authorities  brought under  control so  that presently  it  is
continued to borrow heavily. Ironically much of  about 40 percent of GDP.
this  borrowing  was  used  for  investment.
However a lot of the investnents were not well  Recent policies to privatize some of the
conceived so that while they did lead to a short-  public  sector  industries  has  helped  restrain20
budget deficits.  The overall reform of the  energy crisis and trade collapse",. The broad
economy has also been helped by the large  international  (both  successful  and unsuccessful)
influx  of EC structural  funds.  experience in  addressing external  shocks
suggests a  number of  policy responses for
The unemploynent  rate  below  5 percent  consideration. Among  many policy measures,
at the beginning  of the nineties  is the lowest  in  the following  ones are especially  relevant for
the EC except  for Luxembourg.  Ukraine, and thus deserve a high priority in
policy agenda.
Table  XV
Portugal: Impacts  of  (a)  Macroeconomic  Stabilization
and  Response to Exteral Shocks  Full  commitment to  and  effective
(Annual  Average  over the Period)  implementation of  systemic  reforms  and
macroeconomic stabilization are  necessary,
72-75 '7&a  81-85 86-91  though not sufficient, conditions to successflully
--  dealing  with external  shocks. Appropriate  fiscal
Macroeconomic  Indicators  (%)  and monetary  policies  shall be pursued  to curb
GDP Growth  4 .0  5.2  1 .1  4.1.  inflation  and  to  restore  macro-economic
Inflation  (CPI)  16.9  21.6  23.3  11.4  imbalances,  especially  the state budget deficit
Budget  Deficit/GDP  8.4  10.0  11.4  9.1  and the current account deficit in the balance of
ExtemalDebt/GDP  9.8  30.6  66.9  46.1  payments.
Monetay  Expansion  2. 8  -0.1  0.4  5.3
The  economy  will  become  less
(mpacts  of ExteGnDa  Shocks  vulnerable  to external  shocks  when a competitive
Terns  of Trade  Effect  2.9  1.9  0.0  -0.1  market  system  has  been  developed  through
Export  Volume  Effect  0.5  0.1  0.3  -0.6  privatization of ownership and liberalization of
Interest  Rat Effcct  0.0  O.1  -0.3  -O.1  prices and controls. It is essential  to dismantle
Additional  Debt  Senrices  0.3  1.0  2.8  1.2  the  wide range of  regulations  that  presently
Total  3.7  3.1  2.8  0.5  cover  virtually  all  facets  of  economic  life.
Performnance  Respg.ses  Reform of the legal system should move quicidy
Export Promotion  -1.1  0.3  1.7  1.2  to dearly establish private property rights, allow
lmport  lntensiW  1.5  -0.4  1.0  -4.2  for  enforcement of  contracts,  and  provide  a
Economic  Conmresion  0.8  0 .1  1.1  -0.5  supportive  environment  for  commercial
Extraordinary  Borrowing 2.4  32.1  -1.0  4.0  activities.
Total  3.7  3..1  2.8  0.5
Sources: Staff calculation.  (b)  Structura  Adjutment
The  fundamental way to  cope  with
external shocks in the medium and long run is
52  Broad Lessons for Ukaine  though  growth-oriented  adjustment 13. The
permanent nature of the external shocks demand
From the above  analysis,  it is clear that  significant  structural changes  to better reflect
the main challenges for Ukraine in coping with  Ukraine's comparative advantages. The service
external shocks in the short to medium run are  sector, which  was underdeveloped during  the
to  design  effective strategies and  appropriate  Soviet era (especially services in the financial
policies  to  mitigate  the  adverse  impacts of  market, e.g. banking and insurance), should bereconstructed  to  meet demands of  a  private  energy  price increases. Some  countries,  such as
market  economy. Non-traditional  industries  of  Korea,  tend  to pass  on most  of the price increase
high  value-added and  low  energy  intensity  to gasoline  users while moderating  the increase
should be encouraged  to develop  at a fast pace.  for productive  industries  and also shielding  the
The design  and  the quality  of Ukrainian  products  poorer groups  (who  tend to use kerosene  in that
should be  upgraded to  enable sales  in  the  country). Most  European  countries  also tend  to
international markets at  reasonable domestic  have high gasoline prices. In these countries
resource costs and to change Ukraine's export  there  is  broad  public  acceptance for  this
composition  from mostly  intermediate  materials  approach also because it  moderates adverse
to manufactured  goods.  environmcntal  effects  of energy  consumption.
(c)  Improvement  of Economic  Efficiency,  (d)  Integration into the World Trade
especially  Energy Efriciency  and Finance Systems
High  economic  efficiency  can  Changing from inward- to  outward-
considerably reduce the  adverse impact of  orientation  will reinforce  Ukraine's strength  to
external  shocks,  as  exemplified in  some  cope with  external shocks.  As shown by
countries with very limited natural resources,  experiences  of Eastern  Asian  countries  including
such  as  Japan  and  South  Korea.  Most  China, integration into the  world trade and
enterprises  in Ukraine should be privatized  to  finance  systems  will  enable  Ukraine  to reduce  its
improve  protection  efficiency,  and competitive  reliance on particular  sources for  imports of
markets in factors, goods, capital, and foreign  energy  and raw materials,  diversify  markets  for
exchange should be  developed to  improve  Ukraine's  exports,  and  to  absorb  foreign
allocation  efficiency. For those  state  enterprises  financial  resources  to support  domestic  economic
remaining  in some most crucial sectors or at  recovery.
natural  monopolist positions, their  budgets
should  be hardened  and their behaviors  should  Active  policies  should  remove  the anti-
be  "marketized", as  some  Chinese  state  export bias, price-allocation  controls, and state
enterprises  have  successfully  done. Meanwhile,  monopoly  on foreign  trade. Emphasis  should  be
outdated  capital  should  be  replaced  and  put on export  promotion  and more  efficient  use
production  technology  should  be upgraded.  of imports.  It should be also a priority to
reopen  the  interbank market  for  foreign
Ironically  the  very  poor  energy  exchange  and to unify the exchange  rate at the
efficiency of  the  economy also  offers the  market rate' 4. Meanwhile,  it is very important
prospect  of significant  returns  for policy  reforms  to  simplify  the  necessary  administrative
in  that sector.  It  would be very useful to  procedures for international  trade and foreign
develop an energy balance and see where the  investment,  for example  adapting  the one-stop
most  significant savings can  be  achieved.  shops commonly adopted in  Eastern  Asian
Given the relatively high energy intensity in  countries.
Ukraine, enormous savings can  be  realized
through energy  conservation. A key policy  to  In some  sectors,  such as tourism, there
achieve  this is pricing of energy.  Significant  is remarkable  potential.  A cursory review of
adjustment  in administered  energy  prices  should  some of  the other former socialist countries
be made to ensure that consumers  pay the full  indicates that  significant results  could  be
cost of energy  they consume. Poor households  achieved in as short a period as one to two
may be compensated  through  targeted  financial  years. Another  area  that warrants  consideration
assistance. There are many ways to pass on  is the establishment  of free trade zones. Again22
there is wide international  experience  available  VI.  Concluding Remarks
on the pros  and  cons  of these  operations.  Given
the  hiswry  of Ukraine  and  especially  Odessa  and  Adverse  external  shocks  have not only
its Black Sea environment,  this could also be  significantly  complicated  Ukraine's transition
done relatively  quickly.  from  a  centrally planned economy into a
competitive  market economy, but also have
added serious  challenges  to the policymakers.
(e)  Prndent Debt Management  This  paper  provides  a quantitative  framework  for
identifying  the major external  shocks and the
Borrowing  excessively  either  externally  nature  of policy  response  to these  shocks. Not
or domestically  is not advisable  in principle,  as  surprisingly,  ihe most severe shock was the
this practice  only shifts the current  burden of  deterioration  in Ukraine's  terms  of trade  brought
external  shocks  into the near future, and could  about by the steep increase in the price of
set in motion  a debt spiral. Prudent  borrowing  energy  imports  (mainly  from  Russia). Again  not
and debt management  strategies  are needed  to  surprisingly,  the policy response  was largely
ensure  that  future  debt repayment  obligations  do  inactive and  ineffective, trough  increased
not choke  off the country's  growth  potential.  reliance on  additional external borrowing,
accumulating  payment arrears, and restoring
On  financing  the external  gaps,  there  are  administrative  interventions. To some extent,
many different  approaches  that may be more  these  inappropriate  responses  have  contributed  to
suitable  than debt financing".  These include  the  economic  crisis  that  Ukraine  currently  faces.
direct foreign investment,  various debt equity  Consequently,  little  adjustment  has  occurred  thus
swaps, lease back schemes and privatization  far and Ukraine's  economy  remains  fragile and
open  to foreign  participation. At the same  time  mired in difficulties.
it is important  that all debt incurred  should  be
used  effectively  and  constructively.  To  the  extent
possible  creditors  should  be willing  to share at  However, Ukraine does have  great
least some of the risk to ensure that projects  potential  for economic  recovery  and sustainable
involving  foreign  financing  are well  conceived  development. It is essential  to move towards
and mznaged.  stabilization  so that Ukraine's evident strong
resource base can  be  used  effectively  fbr
In  this  context, it  is  desirable to  sustainable  growth.
formulate  policies  to encourage  private  foreign
direct investment,  to  improve efficiency  of
utilization of  foreign  debt,  and  to  take
advantages  of altemative  channels  to finance  the
extnal  gaps.23
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Notes:
I.  As pointed out by Tarr (1993), moving to world prices leads to improvement in the terms of
trade for exporters of raw material and energy (notably Kazakhstan,  Russia, and Turkmenistan)
and deterioration in the terms of trade for countries relying on food and machinery  exports (such
as Ukraine and Moldova). Tarr's estimates  based on 1990  data of 105 trading sectors show that
a full scale adoption of international  prices for inter-republic  trade implies for Ukraine a tenms
of trade loss of around 6.4 percent of GDP per year.
2.  As for most empirical studies on historically  socialist economies,  finding reliable  basic statistics
poses a major problem.  Accuracy  of our quantitative  results can be discounted  to some extent
because  of poor data reliability. However, our qualitative  analysis  can be reasonably  plausible.
3.  There exists extensive literature on external  shocks and their impacts on policy formulation and
economic  performance. One common approach is the applied computable  general equilibrium
analysis, e.g.,  Elbadawi and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991), Go (1991), Hoon and Phelps (1992),
Mendoza  (1992), Schmidt-Hebbel  and Serven  (1992), Devarajan, Lewis, Robinson  (1993), Grais
and Chu (1994), and van Wijnbergen  (1982), when information  shortage is not a major problem.
The other approach-macroeconomic  accounting  decomposition  framework--is  very heuristic and
practical and has been applied to many developed  and developing  countries, e.g. Balassa (1985),
Ballasa and McCarthy (1984),  Ballasa and Tyson (1983), McCarthy, Neary and Zanalda (1994),
McAleese and McCarthy (1989), and McCarthy and Dhareshwar (1992).  The comparative
advantage  of this approach is that it is relatively robust, easy to implement and transparent.
4.  In the case of Ukraine, most of the external financing in the past two years has been through
arrears accumulation.
5.  However, it is important  to stress that there exists a growing unofficial  or black economy that
might be as much as 25 percent of the GDP in early 1994.
6.  In Europe, Ukraine  ranks second in territory (smaller than only Russia) and fifth in population.
However, it is still very "small" in international  transactions in the sense that Ukraine has little
power to manipulate  the international  prices of its traded goods.
7.  Currently, about a quarter of gas consumed in Western Europe is supplied  by Russia through
Ukraine (60 billion cubic meters in 1992). See Grais and Zheng (1994)  for a detailed study on
the strategic interdependence  in the East-West  gas trade and a fair division of the trade gain.
8.  It is estimated  that direct barter exchange between  enterprises could amount to as much as 50
percent of the total inter-republic  trade.  This contributes  to under-recording  of trade though
its impact on trade balance  could be limited.
9.  Since Ukraine does not export oil and gas, the major trade partners' GDP deflator is used as a
proxy for the unit value of exports.
10.  In fact, a large part of merchandise  exchanged  between republics has already been priced at
international  levels in late 1993.
11.  More detailed  stLudies  on adjustments  to external  shocks for a larger sample of developing
countries can be found, for example, in Rajapatirana, Corden,  Cooper, and  Little (1993).26
12.  See also Sanderson and Williamson(1985)  for a comprehensive  review on how developing
should countries adjust to extenal shocks and an examination of policy simulations using
some World Bank macroeconomic  models.
13.  Bruno (1982) sets up a good framework to discuss adjustments  and structural change under
supply shocks.
14.  Khan (1986)  reviewed  exchange rate policy response to exogenous shocks in developing
Countries.
15.  Martin and Selowsky (1988) and Kharas and  Shishido (1985) provide good discussions  on
foreign borrowings and macroeconomic  adjustments  to external shocks.27
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Table I
Ukraine: Energy Inports  from the FSU
1991  199  1993
Unit  Esfimated
Volume  (mtoe)  127.2  116.4  93.6
Crude Oil  million Ton  51.1  34.1  19.6
Oil Product  6.1  6.2
Gas  bem  89.5  89.6  79.8
From Russia  77.1  54.3
From Turkmenustan  12.5  25.5
Price  Rublettoe  83  4,936  59.456
Crude Oil  Ruble/Ton  70  9,381  75,246
Oil Product  85  11,335  92.642
Gas: Russia  RubleiTcm  78  2,070  47,490
Turkmenistan  78  2,058  36,821
Value  billion Rubles  10.6  574.4  5,566.8
Crude Oil  3.6  319.9  1,474.8
Oil Product  69.1  574.4
Gas  7.0  185.3  3,517.6
From Russia  159.6  2578.7
From Turkmenistan  25.7  938.9
As % of  Total  FSU  Imports
Total  %  14.0  46.1  53.2
Crude Oil  4.7  25.7  14.1
Oil Product  5.5  5.5
Gas  . 9.2  14.9  33.6
As  % of GDP
Total  %  3.6  14.4  15.6
CrudeOil  1.2  8.0  4.1
Oil Product  - 0.0  1.7  1.6
Gas  2.4  4.6  9.8
Energy Price Effect  billion Rubles  564  5.148
CmudnOil  318  1,291
Oil  Poduct  69  504
Gas  178  3,353
From Russia  154  2,466
Frwn Turkuzenistan  . 25  886
Sources: Ukrainian  autoits  and staff cacato.28
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TAhe 2
Ukraine: Inpact of Non-Energy Terms-of-Trade Shocks




Volume  billion  Units  74.0  65.0  52.0
Change  !h  -1212  -20.0
Value  billion  RbI  74.0  881.0  6745.0
Unit  Value  Rbl/Unit  1.0  13.6  129.7
Change  %  1,255.4  857.0
Price  Effect  billion  Rbl  816.0  6.040.2
Imworts
Volume  billion  Units  65.0  47.0  33.D
Change  5  -27.7  -29.1
Value  billion  Rbl  65.0  672.0  4,896.0
Unit Value  RblIUnit  1.0  14.3  148.4
Change  %  1.329.8  937.7
Price  Effect  billion  Rbl  625.0  4.424.2
Balnce  billion  Rbl  9.0  209.0  1.849.0
Tms  of Trade  100.0  94.8  87.4
Change  -5.2  -7.8
TOT Effect  billion  Rbl  -191.0  -1.616.0
Trade with ROW
Exports
Volume  million  Unit  7.317.0  6,000.0  6.593.0
Change  %  -18.0  9.9
Valuc  million  ULS$  7,317.0  6,000.0  6,600.0
Unit Value  USS/Unit  1.000  1.000  1.101
Change  %  0.0  0.1
Price  Effect  nillion USS  0.0  7.0
Volume  miion  Unit  10,000.0  5,500.0  4,726.0
Change  9  -45.0  -14.1
Value  million  USS  10,000.0  5,500.0  4,730.0
Unit Value  USS13Unit  1.0  1.0  1.0
Change  %  0.0  0.1
Price Effect  nillion USS  0.0  4.0
Balance  million US$  -2.683.0  500.0  1,867.0
Terms of Trade  100.0  100.0  100.0
TOT Effwt  million  USS,  0.0  -3.0
Sources:  Ukrainian authorities  and staff calrulaiom.29
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Table 3
Ukraine:  Volume Impacts of Exports and Imports
1991  1992  1993
Estimated
GDP Growth Rate
Average  of Trade Partners  (%)  (0.2)  (0.7)  0.0
FSU  (%)  (12.9)  (18.5)  (I  1.5)
ROW  (%)  (0.1)  (0.5)  0.1
Ukraine  (%)  (11.9)  (13.7)  (18.0)
Export Shrinking Rate
FSU  12.7  17.8  11.5
ROW  (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.1)
Inport  Shrinking Rate  11.7  13.0  18.0
Export Volume Effects
FSU  billion  Rbl  178.7  968.2
ROW  million  US$  (13.2)  (7.0)
Import Volume Effects
FSU  billion  Rbl  121.0  1,254.0
ROW  million  US$  1,302.0  990.0
Import  Substitution/Intensity
FSU  billion  Rbl  130.0  675.9
ROW  million  US$  3,130.0  (216.2)
Export Promotion
FSU  bilUion  Rbl  63.6  (716.7)
ROW  million  US$  1,280.4  (587.6)
Sources: Ukrainian  authorities  and staff calculation.Annex
Table 4
GREECE:  External  Shocks,  Performance  Response  Measures  and Selected  Economic  Indicators
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1911  1592  1983  1984  1985  5986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991
Eaternatl  Shocks
(as * percent  share  of GDP)
TerrneofTradefEffect  -024  269  600  0.60  0.82  2.11  141  256  2.57  089  -089  .021  0.22  001  .119  121  203  -077  194  -081
ExportVotumeeffet  -0406  0.27  0.25  1.33  -034  0.40  0.13  -0.11  033  0.75  098  008  -080  002  -001  -044  -071  -043  -009  -016
Interest  Rate  Effect
Additional  Debt  Sev.  qP.00  -0.03  0.22  023  0.33  0.38  060  0.69  1.30  166  1.14  133  1.44  1.11  093  0.89  103  1 31  129  121
Total  -0.30  2.39  6.46  2.16  0  82  2.6d9  2,14  3.15  430  330  123  $21  087  1.13  -027  168  23a  012  314  024
Performance Responas  Measures
(ars  a percent  share  of  GDP)
Additioial  Net Egefnal  Fnanc  o0.48  2 68  1 33  2.84  1  55  1.96  0.48  3.88  -0.14  .1.21  3.77  .1 08  - 09  3 25  0 56  252  1  87  46  5 71  306
EixpciPromotion  0.76  1.87  -036  1.69  -078  .0.41  1.17  *1.24  1.21  .1.72  086  068  094  -077  208  -017  -484  329  -070  077
Import  lntenstty  4 33  -2.17  3855  -2 64  '0 13  0.56  0 66  0 09  2.55  4  94  4  24  0 57  -0 12  -1 36  -3 13  -1.39  6 09  -7  68  -2 29  -3 44
EconomicCompression  -025  0.01  1.95  0.27  01 7  018  -017  041  068  1.29  084  1,03  013  001  022  069  -058  -045  042  -015
Total  -0.30  2.39  6.46  2.16  082  289  2.14  315  430  330  123  121  087  1.13  -027  166  238  012  314  024
Selected Economic Indicatois
GDP  growt  h  8.9  7.3  -3.2  6.0  e.0  3.0  5.8  3 4  2.1  0.0  0o5  0 1  2 9  3 0  1 6  -10  4 2  34  -0 3  2 2
CPI (¶S)  43  15.5  28.9  13.4  133  12.2  12.5  19.0  249  245  209  20 2  184  193  230  164  13S  137  204  195
PrivataconAIGDP(%  65.7  63.4  67.7  87.5  658  65.9  65.2  633  639  67.5  57.4  667  647  685  674  698  683  704  714  703
GovernmentcounsuDP(%)  12.2  11.5  13.8  15.2  15.1  18.0  15,9  16.3  16.4  180  183  188  195  204  194  197  200  205  211  19s
Orosadomestieinv/DP  (%)  29.6  358  29.3  27.0  263  26.4  27.7  301  25.0  254  21.1  219  901  213  198  172  193  205  198  199
FlsedwtvlGOPI%)  27.8  280  22.2  20.8  212  230  23.9  25.8  24.2  223  19.9  203  185  191  185  168  175  192  194  182
PrivfleadInvtGOP  ('  19.3  20,2  155  150  155  179  155  201  186  163  140  133  109  109  115
Pub6fxhdInv/GDP  8.4  78  6.7  6.a  57  51  53  5.7  5.8  59  60  70  76  81  70
Groesdomeasticay/OOP(-)  212  248  19.8  17.0  180  180  20.6  22.4  19.7  109  108  116  118  97  113  99  127  118  as9  768
DOficiVoDP  %)  -17  -2.7  -4 2  3.9  -3 9  -4  -4.3  -3 9  -50  -109  -18 5  *s 2  .14  0  -14 5  -110  -13 5  -15 3  -265
Monetaryexpansion(M2-CPI)  19.4  49  -106  10.1  128  106  9.4  1.6  -88  28  98  07  51  7.4  -46  51  101  84  -19  -121
Nominal  inlaerst  tate  (Treasury Bill Ralt)  170  173  163  165  18s  188
Realaxerte  Itidx  (1980=100)  1149  '1000  1035  107.4  994  963  932  873  893  916  926  983  995
Nom axe.rata(OrachmasperUSI)  30.0  296  300  32.1  36.5  36.8  36.7  37.0  42.6  65.4  665  e81  1127  1381  1400  1354  1419  1624  1588S  1823
Tolalrasamres  (MilllonsaotUSI)  899  899  782  964  881  1048  1305  1343  1345  1022  861  901  954  868  1519  2681  3619  3223  3412  5189
Pnma,yschool  ant ratio  104  103  103  100  103  105  105  105  104  102  101  99  97
Sacondaryschoolear.  mba  7a  80  51  51  81  81  84  85  68  90  95  95  98  9a
Irrantmordt;ty  rale  273  24.1  239  24  225  204  19.3  18.7  17.9  163  151  146  143  141  122  117  11  97  97  9
UrremploymentRate%of  labourforce)  2.3  1.9  1 7  18  1.9  26  4  58  7.8  81  78  74  7.4  77  74  7  52
Sasin:  l" lWlml  pnl  Word  wOatto.  resmacswag  grqvn  ald  rmarluiogy  InMeCarshy. Neary. Zinildi I tCUI.
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Table  5
HUNGARY:  External  Shocks,  Performance  Response  Measures  and Selected  Economic  Indicators
1972  ?973  1974  7975  1978  1977  1970  1979  1980  1901  1982  1983  1984  1905  19Be  1  987  19e  8  19E9  1990  T991
External Shocks
(as a percent  share  atGDPI
Terms  of Trade  Effect  .0 17  -0 49  5 42  3 87  *1  06  1 72  0 75  1.29  0.02  0 33  1 20  0 95  1 29  .0 25  2 02  -0 46  *0 77  .0 83  -0 19  3 50
ExportVolumueefect  40.43  -187  1.48  643  .162  141  053  40.41  121  2.05  334  028  -263  005  -002  -126  -192  -153  .023  *042
InterestRateEftect  na  nf  na  f  na  ta  mlu  na  na  001  031  .039  -. 06  020  *05G  -047  014  029  039  -030  -078
AdditionalDebtSeN.  0.00  -063  *1.03  008  0.43  0.23  0.37  1.01  0.60  063  053  025  0005  -0 05  .005  016  015  -006  .003  -003
Total  -0.60  *2.99  5 88  10.37  .2.25  3.36  1.65  1.89  1.84  332  4 E8  0 82  .109  -083  148  -142  -225  -2 03  4075  2 56
Performance Response  Measures
(as a percent  share  of GDP)
AdditlonalNetExternalFinunc  *8.25  -3.74  10.63  708b  .296  1.21  572  -357  4043  0.21  -166  .203  .109  -019  308  .017  .246  021  *016  689
ExpoiPromotion  3.35  *021  -2.99  6.28  :5.00  3.08  .1.41  1.65  .0  4  098  436  2.72  .147  -1.49  -179  -0E6  .128  .317  -219  -304
Impo-rtintensity  4.68  1.68  -1.75  .2.73  1434  -0.60  *309  200  0.47  14A  0 78  -137  102  -041  -020  046  074  043  oo0  -459
EconomicCompression  -037  .072  -007  -025  137  -034  0.43  1.79  224  065  120  150  045  126  039  .085  075  050  151  330
Total  *060  .2.99  5.86  10.37  -2.25  3.36  1.65  1.89  184  3.32  468  082  -109  -0o3  1.48  -14z  -225  -203  *075  25Z
Selected Economie Indlcators
GDPgrowth N)  64  7.5  5e8  63  36  6.8  47  1,S  00  3.9  19  07  26  -01  15  45  -05  0°1  39  .105
cPI (%)  34  18  38  52  39  4.7  9.0  93  45  7.0  84  87  70  53  82  163  166  289  401  H
PrivateconsiOOPC%)  57.2  56.3  582  59.2  58.1  57.4  57.4  588  61.2  61.3  608  615  61.4  628  639  635  611  607  617  680
oovernmentconslG0PI%)  99  9.4  10.4  10.4  101  99  10.4  10.4  103  10.1  99  t10  97  101  107  103  116  103  107  123
(Orossdodnesticinv0P(vti  31.7  29.?  35.8  37.8  359  37.2  41.3  340  30.7  297  28.5  265  25.7  250  269  267  247  257  240  226
Fwed  lm'GDP  ()  29.9  28.7  31.0  33.4  31.8  340  34.0  32.4  28.8  265  252  246  230  225  240  247  204  201  17e  209
GrossdormesticraviGOP(¶&  330  342  31.3  30.3  31.8  32.7  32.1  30.7  28.5  286  293  284  289  271  255  262  273  290  277  197
OeticWGoP  >}  .2.8  -1  0  -0  7  1 6  -1  0  -2  8  33  -02  -19  0 8
Rel  exc.rate  Index  ($O=1100)  92.4  100.0  108.3  112.0  1057  107.t  1104  992  892  910  921  980  1088d
Noam.excrate  (FortnipperUS.)  553  490  46.8  44.0  41.8  410  37.9  356  32.5  34.3  366  427  48O  51  458  470  504  591  632  747
EIternal  debt  (Millions  of  USSR  43  8245.3  8865.3  97635  97855  10196  10733  10990  13955  16907  195U4  19603  20390  21269  22657
Eternaldebtl0DP  (%)  0.3  49.6  46.2  44.1  43.1  440  51  1  540  67.7  71.2  750  681  696  646  717
Toal  reseres  (Miliona  of USS)  1231  1560  2153  2302  1634  1467  1246  1070  3936
Exp on  edueatronG0P  1 0  0 9  0 8  0 9  0 9  1.3  1 2
EDp on  lAlhIGoP  1.5  15  17  19  20  21  10
Prinmary schodolenr.  rato  99  98  97  96  96  99  99  99  98  98  97  95  92
Secondary  school  nr. raio  63  70  89  73  73  73  72  70  70  72  78
Infnaitmo4allyrale  332  338  34.3  32.8  29.8  28.2  24.4  23.7  23.1  20.6  197  19  202  204  19  17  158  157  148  156
5"r.  4:  h.,eam  "ckleh  n  I,WlffieThM0g  1  dIyaE  eamn  buaMon  ,.md  Iteddegy  hIM  MaCarv, N.aly.  ZZ,naIdJ  IICHI.
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Table  6
KOREA:  External  Shocks,  Performance  Response  Measures  and Selected  Economic  Indicators
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1979  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  986  1987  1988  1989  190  1999t
Extmhial  Shocks
(as  a percent  share  ot GOP)
TermsofTttdeEffect  1.45  472  693  -106  -1.99  153  08f4  204  459  -034  t.11  004  -073  000  -155  177  *1 34  0g91  027  -031
Export  Volume elfsct  -012  -0 69  0 54  290  0 59  0 84  0 30  0 24  0 81  1  34  2 52  018  -1  8S  003  .0 02  -0 95  -1 56  -1 28  20  -0 32
InteretsRateElfect  -003  011  005  0.16  8  0g09  001  013  014  017  026  -040  -051  022  4047  -035  007  006  006  4004  -00D
AdditionalDebtSefv  000  -039  -033  022  003  .021  -034  -015  034  004  -012  -057  4091  -D  87  -0  80  -104  -114  .135  -097  -061
Total  129  385  7.19  1.00  -283  216  073  1.79  592  131  089  -085  -309  -130  -272  .015  -397  -348  -094  -131
Performance Response  Measures
(as a percent  share  of  GDP)
Addtional Net Extersal  Financ  -5 2B  -0 12  8 30  -2 12  -4 93  -1 58  2 07  3 65  -2 18  -1 10  -5 42  -3 11  -2 34  -3 20  .6 12  -4 29  -3 68  1  24  -0 05  0  24
ExpoG  Promotion  3 95  5 65  0 83  3 60  4 05  501  1 67  1 62  1 13  4 85  3 28  3 20  2 48  I 05  3 94  5 03  1 30  -2  68  oo7  o0
Impon  lnlunsity  18  7  -o 56  -009  -025  -078  -097  -274  -078  203  -306  267  019  -265  0 51  110  02b  -067  -261  -102  -217
EcononicCronpression  075  112  014  067  -098  -030  -027  053  424  071  037  -133  -0  8  003  -163  -117  -091  057  006  025
Total  1.29  3 85  7.19  190  -2 63  218  0 73  1.79  5 92  131  089  -o 85  -3 09  -130  -2 72  -015  -3 97  -3 48  -0 94  -131
Selected  Economic Indicators
GOP grwth)  58  152  89  7.7  135  11  109  74  3J  69  74  121  92  69  123  118  114  61  9  84
CPI(%)  117  32  243  253  153  102  145  183  287  213  72  34  23  25  28  3  71  57  86  97
Punvate  eo,'stGDP(9  73 8  69 7  70 4  70 9  G6  0  82 9  51 5  62 6  64 2  639  62 5  61 0  60  1  59 4  55 5  52 6  514  53  3  530  52 7
Governmsretconsl/GDP(%)  101  84  9.6  11.0  109  107  10.3  98  115  116  115  107  100  101  101  99  98  105  106  10B
Grcss  domestic  invlOa0  20 8  24 5  31  6  27.1  25 3  27 3  31 4  35  5  31 7  29 5  28  6  28  8  29 a  29 3  28 3  29 5  30  8  33 4  36 9  391
FixedinvrGDP  IS)  203  230  254  249  240  269  309  326  321  280  284  292  289  262  278  287  232  316  365  380
Privfixeduinv/GOPl  S2  151  190  212  202  192  217  256  267  251  210  237  248  245  239  240  250  253  276  320
Pubfixedinv/GDP  53  41  42  47  48  5.2  53  60  70  89  47  45  44  44  39  38  39  40  45
rmss  domestic  savlG0P(%)  161  21 6  20  6  185  241  27.5  28 5  28 2  24 3  24  5  26 0  28 3  29 9  30 5  34 4  37 5  38 9  36 2  36 4  36 5
D0siciPO0PC%)  -38  -05  -22  -20  -14  -18  -12  -17  -22  -33  -30  -1  -12  -12  -01  04  16  02  -07  -17
Monetary  epansion(MZCPF)  130  36 2  25  1.8  142  27 2  23 0  8 4  -2 8  51  21 7  18  3  80  9 3  14 7  15 2  110  12  6  13 1  99
Norminteresttale(Gov  BondYieid)  21.0  211  216  215  216  252  288  236  174  131  143  136  116  124  130  147  150  165
Realexcrate  index  (1980=100)  1306  1000  1044  1068  1026  1012  955  80o  E01  889  1014  988  ga8
Non. exacraue  (Won  perUS$)  393  398  404  484  484  484  454  484  607  681  731  776  806  870  e81  823  731  671  708  733
Externaldebt(MillronsotUSI)  3203  39235  5091  3  64887  79828  14343  17301  22885  29480  32989  37330  40419  42099  47133  46724  39808  35716  32796  34251  40518
External  debUOGDP  CS  30 0  29  0  27.0  30 7  27 8  38 6  34 5  35 5  47 1  47.3  50 1  49 1  46 7  50 7  44 1  30 2  20 4  15 4  14  3  14 3
Totalreserves  (Milfions  of  US5  523  864 81  277.19  781 32  1970  2967.1  2763  9  2959  2  2924 9  2661 7  2807  3  2346 7  2753 6  2869 3  3319  6  3583  7  12347  t5214  14793  13701
Expon  aducaltorIGOP  28  22  20  22  25  26  26  28  30  30  38  31  30  29  29  29
EyponhealWtODP  02  02  01  02  02  03  03  0.2  02  02  03  02  02  0Z  04  03
Ptimary  schoolmrn  rario  107  107  109  109  110  103  99  97  98  101  104  105
8econdarr  school  ant. ratio  56  61  64  68  75  76  87  91  90  89  87  86  88
Infant  modality  ratle  47  35  20
Ses, f:  EmWr  il  RAF.el  *,,  peiee  e  cythgs cton  ti e  te  lit  MeCa, n,  Nt; ,nbId  11941.
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Table 7
PHILIPPINES:  External Shocks, Performance Response Measures and Selected Economic Indicators
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1197  1978  1979  1980  19f1  1982  1983  1984  T985  1986  1997  1988  1989  1990  1991
External Shocks
(as  a percent  share  of GDP)
TerrmsofTaadeEffect  101  -224  3.19  639  008  063  1.32  080  310  219  038  -187  -144  155  -0S2  011  189  0o85  378  060
Export  Volumeeffect  .015  -052  028  2.55  -044  0.48  0.19  .028  0.75  100  135  004  -103  009  025  -063  .093  4068  003  -033
Interest  Rate  Effect  .0.14  0 35  0.12  -0.29  -018  0.02  0 35  0.31  021  0 34  0 43  -0 72  0 30  -0 59  -0 45  0 15  0 25  0 28  -0 22  -0 53
AdditionalOebtServ.  000  0.17  -009  042  062  059  072  1,20  1.52  2.19  208  196  233  145  115  109  131  155  183  162
Total  073  -223  3.49  9.06  010  172  257  2.03  556  572  336  -058  016  250  0.12  072  -126  202  542  136
Performance Response Measures
(ass ,percent  share  of  GCOP)
Additional  Net External  Financ  2 26  -2.83  6 63  6 34  0 61  -0 24  4 25  2 8B  3 44  2 84  2 38  -o 27  4 21  -0 53  -0 09  3 52  2 55  6 09  5 55  -1 82
ExpcrtPrormotton  .347  o 30  -189  343  -026  165  .045  .048  194  132  025  -160  -144  -080  0 79  .0 62  027  103  069  -032
Import  Intensity  208  138  -159  -071  001  037  .1.14  .016  031  1.10  025  043  274  175  -058  -167  -284  -217  122  181
Economic  Compression  -0.14  .0 30  0 35  -0 O1  0 26  -0 05  -008  .0 22  -0 11  0 46  0.49  0 87  3 07  2 06  -01  4  05  11  24  -2 93  -2 04  1  68
TotI  alI  073  -2.23  3.49  9.05  010  172  257  203  556  572  336  .0B5  016  250  012  072  -126  202  542  136
Seleceid  Economic Indicators
GOP  grAmh 11)  54  a5  3.4  55  88  55  51  5.6  51  3.4  36  18  .73  -73  34  48  63  60  26  .08
CPI (sq  8.2  166  342  6.8  92  9.9  7.3  175  182  13.1  102  100  503  231  08  38  8a  122  141  187
PiivSto an&/GDP(%l  655s  638  654  645  623  622  636  825  66.7  671  i888  686  721  750  721  732  712  707  705  703
Governmentcons1GOP(¶&}  102  95  9.9  107  108  103  101  9.4  91  58  91  83  70  76  80  84  90  92  102  102
GrossdomesticlnvGOP C%1  20.8  218  269  309  329  30.6  30.6  332  29.1  275  279  296  218  153  160  180  184  218  249  209
FiredinvGODP(%  17.7  17.1  199  24.6  253  252  252  27.5  27.2  278  275  298  245  175  1i8  170  173  209  241  207
ouncifoOP  59  79  7.6  52  31  26  48  11  24  20  50  17
E,peiaditurei0OP  (%)  152  161  138  170  153  140  147  136  15.5  17.0  165  144  127  140  18O  175  170  186  205  199
MonetaryexpansionlM2.CPI)  55  -11.6  14  94  17.6  213  .1.5  -08  58  152  79  -267  -134  06  92  125  156  116  22
Nominteresatrate(Gov.BondYield)  119  94  100  103  102  10g  109  123  121  125  138  142  285  267  161  115  147  186  237  215
Nar.excrale  (PeuosperUSli  6 7  a a  66  7.3  7 4  7.4  7.4  74  7 5  7.9  8 5  11 I  167  186  20 4  206  211  217  24 3  275
Real  ec.  rate index  (11  985s-1)  97.3  102.4  1057  1097  923  914  1000  760  718  698  749  729  720
Estedral  debt (Millions  of  USII  1962  2028  2428  3064  4437  8183  10772  13252  17417  20883  24551  24395  24355  26622  28207  29763  25965  28375  30232  31258
extrlnaldebtlPGl)  24.5  20.1  17.6  206  259  41.6  47.4  48.3  53.7  566  661  735  775  866  944  894  761  667  654  698
Primary  cwholenr.  ratio  107  103  108  110  107  113  109  109  107  106  107  109  110  111  110
Secondary  school  *nr, ratio  54  60  e1  63  64  65  88  67  68  64  67  68  71  73
Infant  mtrtality  rate  64  62  60  56  56  54  63  53  52  52  51  50  49  47  46  45  44  43  42  41
EspcneducationJ0/oP  23  2.0  1.8  1.9  19  1.9  21  2.0  1.7  22  2.4  22  18  23  24  25  27  32  33  31
ExpanhealtVGDP  0.5  0.4  05  07  07  07  07  0.7  06  07  07  07  05  07  08  07  a7  0s  08  08
SSIBoo:  EIrasuul  .)tki  ad  AslN  OWMAts  r1C  na-$$  eu.aISa,On  Iiab  d on rrt,dsiog,  5  Maccoty,  Nerv. rqda 101141.
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Tabre 8
PORTUGAL: External Shocks, Performance Response Measures and Selected Economic Indicators
1972  1973  1974  1975  1978  1977  1978  1979  1960  198t  1962  1983  1964  1985  1986  1987  1968  1969  190  1991
External  Shocks
(as a percent  share  of GDP)
TermsaofTradeEffecl  179  299  797  *118  152  1.98  025  268  326  239  .014  097  -111  -195  .340  083  001  025  199  -013
EkportVolumeelfect  -015  *056  0.44  215  .042  045  017  -015  048  104  159  014  -147  003  001  -070  -127  -109  -017  -033
InterestRateEfrect  -004  009  004  .007  .004  000  007  012  013  026  -045  -0*4  040  .0S1  -044  008  014  015  -008  -017
AdditionalDebtSeiv  000  011  033  081  045  064  1.07  1.20  1.44  302  353  300  279  180  084  07a  121  191  133  _116
Total  61.1  263  878  171  151  308  1.55  386  529  671  453  328  060  -094  -301  099  009  122  307-  053
Performance Response  Measures
(as a percent share  of GDP)
Additional  Not External  FPnanc  1 56  2 35  8 56  .2 78  3 47  2 70  *0  35  2 42  7 23  7 28  0 80  -7 38  -215  -3 41  0 99  6 24  748  0oS  5 87  2 78
ExportPrcmction  -048  -063  *055  .277  -154  058  -028  1.13  180  0.15  340  305  086  123  300  -030  059  310  176  -127
Impodt  Intensity  0 89  1 87  -O  42  3 80  -0 37  *0.32  1 59  0 49  -3 56  .19S  -0 03  5  87  -028  1.17  - 74  -4 49  -7 41  -1 28  -3 90  -1 08
EconomicCornpression  -038  -097  1.19  3.46  -008  0.12  059  -018  002  126  03B  174  217  008  -026  -046  -058  -110  -065  009
Total  1.61  2 63  8.76  1 71  1  51  3.08  1 55  2 86  5 29  6.71  4 53  3 28  0 60  4094  -301  0 99  0 09  1 22  3 07  0 53
Uslacted Economic Indicators
GOPgroPwth)  8.0  112  12  -4.3  89  a6  34  57  46  10  31  -01  -16  33  43  44  45  50  43  22
CPI(%)  89  10.4  280  20.4  182  27.1  227  236  166  200  227  251  293  193  117  94  96  126  134  114  LO
4-p.
Privtw runisGOPDP)  64 2  64 8  72.6  77.1  75 0  72.0  68 0  67 5  66 6  69.3  68 7  86g  70S  67 5  65 6  67 6  68 1  666  660  66 1
Oo*vmnentConst`GPC%)  134  128  14.1  150  137  14.0  139  139  144  149  144  146  145  142  135  155  182  164  170  181
Gross  domestic  invmODP)  28 9  29 7  28 5  24 3  25 9  29 0  30 5  29 5  34 1  36 1  37 0  29 1  23 2  21 7  23 3  27 4  29 6  29 1  291  28 3
Fiiis4inWOODP  I)  271  2568  260  25.9  25.1  268  282  272  29.5  31.4  316  296  239  217  223  242  263  264  264  260
GrossdomesticsavIOP(%)  242  227  132  11.9  12.5  140  18.1  18.7  190  159  168  168  150  183  208  211  202  207  212
Delicit/GOP N^  -8.4  *11 5  *65  5  *11.8  -10.1  *9.8  *12 2  -110  5  *9 B  -9 7  *14 8  -12 3  -10 4  -a 7  -4 3
Monetary  expansion  M2.CP3  9 a  17  6  -9.6  -6 7  -3 a  -9 3  -42  1 2  14  9  9 5  0 9  -6 2  -8 9  6 5  8a  8 7  4 7  -0 1  -0 3  9 a
Nom,interest  atre  Treasury8li1  Rata)  124  13.5  144  181  21 1  209  156  139  130  135  142
Ranlexe.rats  ind x(1980=1001  984  1000  1056  1050  975  991  1003  993  979  985  1030  1098  1171
Nam,  mxcrate(Escudg,JperUSS)  27  1  24 5  25.4  256  30 2  38 3  43 9  48 9  501  61.5  795  110 8  146  4  1704  1496  1409  1440  1575  1426  1445
Exlernaldebt  (MillnsofUSS)  8769  109O  1239.4  1502.3  20428  43505  62671  7902.7  9729.2  11577  13598  14516  14870  16633  16642  18303  17877  20424  24207  28S6
Ekt.mrladebtrOP  (%)  102  9.5  9.3  10.2  132  25.5  350  389  39.4  484  582  703  776  801  563  498  429  451  406  416
Toatlrarserns(MillionsofUsI)  1291  1676  1161  398  176  368  B71  931  795  534  447  315  516  1395  1456  3327  5127  9952  14465  20629
Esp wanducatonrGDP  2 4  3 5  3.8  3 7  4 3  4 3  4 2  4 1  3 9  41  4 2  4 6
EsponheaMhtGOP  *  1.0  1.5  33  3.7  4.0  43  39  34  3a  36  34  38
Primarfyschoolenr.,atio  113  117  103  123  121  119  126  124  126  128  121
Secondaryschoolenr.  ratio  53  54  55  48  37  43  47  52  56  63  58  61
inntinonaltyrste  414  445  379  389  33.4  303  291  26  243  21.8  198  192  167  178  159  142  131  122  11  108
at:s  IbrnaI  W  dNeW  i  Bank  tW  l.rwt  ag  IMI*  Cs  c  ,  rn  ur  ii  UcCvV'r.  N..7 . ZIMS 1:541.
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